Politics Across Generations:
Family Transmission Reexamined

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Abstract

We use four waves of panel data on three generations of Americans to evaluate the character and consequences of political socialization within the family. Three major conclusions emerge. First, parents play an important role in the political education of their offspring. Despite transformations in the political environment and character of family life over the past thirty years, our findings about youth coming of age in the 1990s strongly parallel those based on youth socialized in the 1960s. Second, children are more likely to adopt their parents' political orientations if the family is highly politicized and if the parents provide clear and consistent cues over time. These findings confirm expectations drawn from social learning theory. Third, early acquisition of parental characteristics influences the character of adult political development. Adolescents who enter adulthood with a strong parental imprint manifest more attitudinal stability in their early adult years and more continuity over their life-span than do their less well-socialized counterparts.

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Introduction

Writing over thirty years ago, Jennings and Niemi (1968) questioned the conventional wisdom about the role of parents in shaping the political character of their children. By drawing on data collected independently from adolescents and their parents, they demonstrated high variability in the political similarity between parents and their children. Especially when judged against the expectations laid down by reliance on retrospective accounts of parental attributes, the results appeared to downgrade the direct transmission model, wherein parental attributes were passed on, wittingly or unwittingly, to their offspring. These outcomes seemed all the more surprising in view of the considerable overall aggregate congruence between the two generations.

Somewhat lost in the (over) generalizations flowing out of this and related research were a number of important qualifications. Transmission rates tended to vary in a systematic fashion according to type of political trait. The more concrete, affect-laden, and central the object in question, the more successful was the transmission. More abstract, ephemeral, and historically conditioned attributes were much less successfully passed on. Salience of the political object for the parents was an important conditioner of successful reproduction, as was perceptual accuracy on the part of the child (Acock and Bengston 1980; Percheron and Jennings 1981; Tedin 1980; Westholm 1999). The presence of politically homogeneous parents, and other agents allied with the parents, enhanced the fidelity of transmission (Jennings and Niemi 1974, ch. 6; Sebert, Jennings, and Niemi 1974; Tedin 1980). Contextual properties such as larger opinion climates (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 81-82, 161-62) and party systems (Westholm and Niemi 1992) also affected within-family consonance. These specifications and qualifications also lent support to social learning theory explanations of how children come to resemble their parents more in some respects than others. Although not in the tradition of the transmission model, but fully compatible with social learning theory, other inquiries have revealed the importance of communication patterns within the family in shaping the political make-up of the child (e.g., Chaffee, McLeod, and Wackman 1973; Jennings 1983; Tims 1986; Valentino and Sears 1998; on social learning theory generally, see Bandura 1977).

In this paper we return to the topic of intergenerational transmission informed by scholarship subsequent to the earlier research and enriched by the availability of additional data, as described below. We address four main questions, questions raised but not resolved by earlier work. In addressing these questions, we seek to contribute a fresher, more comprehensive understanding of intergenerational transmission, and of how early political socialization influences the dynamics of attitude formation and change over the life course.

The first question, integral to the study of intergenerational transmission, is: How long does the parental legacy persist? One aspect of this question is the degree to which the parental tradition is carried forward over the life course of their offspring. How much of the parental imprint "sticks" to the child over time? Another aspect of the duration question is the degree to which the parent-child pairs move in unison over time. If both parts of the dyad adjust their orientations in response to ongoing secular events in similar fashion, there is at least indirect support for a continuation of the parental legacy. We begin our analysis by evaluating the parental legacy using long-term panel data on both parents and children.

A second question is whether past findings about intergenerational transmission are cohort-specific. Virtually all studies of adolescents and their parents originated between the mid 1960s and the 1970s. In particular, the Jennings and Niemi (1968) findings were based on pairs formed from high school seniors of 1965, a cohort coming of age during such dramatic events as civil disturbances, the Vietnam war, political assassinations, and Watergate, and witnessed by such broad secular trends as declines in political trust and partisanship, the emergence of the second women's movement, and altered norms of social conduct and morality. That being so, it has been suggested that these findings may be cohortcentric, that preceding and succeeding cohorts would exhibit different patterns of relationships, presumably including more faithful political reproduction of their parents (Sears and Funk 1999). Testing for cohortcentrism requires a replication of the research with a subsequent cohort of parent-child pairs,

one where the offspring were socialized under quite different historical circumstances. We respond by comparing parent-child transmission levels for the original Jennings/Niemi pairs with those for a new set of pairs, one where the children were coming of age in the 1990s.

A third question concerns the circumstances under which parental influence is enhanced. According to social learning theory, transmission success should vary according to the strength of cue-giving and reinforcement on the part of the socializer. Previous research has typically evaluated this expectation by seeing if transmission rates are enhanced in highly politicized families. Our analysis assesses the effects of family politicization, but goes further by capitalizing on the longitudinal design to evaluate how the over-time strength of parental cue-giving with respect to specific political orientations influences transmission success.

The final question involves the long-term consequences of early political socialization. How does the early acquisition of political characteristics, via family transmission, influence the child's subsequent political development? Do those who leave home well-socialized differ later in life from those who do not? These are questions where the expectations are strong, but the existing evidence is weak. At a minimum, well-socialized youth should manifest more over-time continuity in their political orientations, withstanding the forces of change more than their less well-socialized counterparts. We evaluate this expectation by examining how patterns of political development over the adult life-span vary according to the success of parental transmission as of late adolescence.

The answers to all of these questions rest fundamentally on parent-child transmission as evident in the similarity of the political attitudes expressed by parent and child. We do not seek to develop a socialization model that takes into account the many factors—especially family social milieu—that influence offspring orientations. Doing so would require sacrificing breadth for depth, thereby inhibiting a careful examination of the transmission process that is so central to claims concerning parental influence. In any event, previous work has demonstrated that the transmission findings tend to be preserved even when family social milieu is taken into account (Dalton 1982; Glass, Bengston, and Dunham 1986; Jennings 1984; Jennings and Niemi 1974, chs. 2-3; Tedin 1974; U.S. Department of Education 1999, 45-56).

Study Design and Measures

To address these four topics we draw on a portion of the longitudinal parent-child political socialization project carried out by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center and Center for Political Studies. The original core of the project consisted of interviews with a national sample of 1669 high school seniors from the graduating class of 1965. Subsequent surveys conducted in 1973, 1982, and 1997 resulted in a four wave panel of 935 individuals, which represents an overall, unadjusted retention rate of 56%.[1] During the first three waves interviews were conducted with at least one parent, thereby enabling the construction of parent-child pairs as units of analysis. Altogether 636 pairs, based on Generations 1 (the parents) and 2 (their offspring), have survived over the course of the study. For convenience we will

[1] All respondents were interviewed face-to-face in 1965, as were the great majority in 1973 and 1982, when an abbreviated mailback questionnaire was used for remotely located individuals. In 1997 approximately one-half of the interviews were face-to-face and the other half by telephone. Respondent bias across the four waves appears to be slight. The crucial comparisons are between the 935 four-wave panel respondents and the 734 respondents surveyed in the 1965 study but not included in one or more of the post-1965 waves. The four-wave panelists as of 1965 had slightly higher scores on measures of political involvement and tended to be slightly more liberal than the non-panelists. However, panel status never accounts for over 2% of the variance in the scores of these explicitly political measures.

often refer to these generations as G1 and G2, respectively.[2]

In addition to reinterviewing G2 in 1997, we also attempted to obtain self-administered data from all their offspring aged 15 and older, i.e., Generation 3 (G3). This effort resulted in receiving useable questionnaires from 769 out of a possible total of 1435 respondents, for a response rate of 54%.[3] Pairing these respondents with their parents yielded a new set of parent-child pairs based on G2 and G3. Two important features distinguish these pairs from those based on the first two generations. First, in contrast to G2, but similar to G1, the third generation has a variable age range, with a mean of 23. As described in more detail below, the age variation proves helpful for certain analytical purposes. It follows that G3, unlike G2, represents only a lineage cohort rather than a high school senior cohort. A second distinguishing feature is that whereas all of the earlier cases involved parents paired with a single child, some of new ones include parents paired with two or more of their children. Overall, 32% of the new cases were based on parents paired with one child, 42% with two, 17% with three, and 4% with four.[4]

In most of what follows we utilize a core set of ten measures by which to assess the prevalence and patterning of correspondence between parents and their offspring. Because of our longitudinal perspective, we are constrained by the availability of questions that were asked across all study waves. However, for the G2-G3 analyses, we are able to analyze additional measures not available in the early surveys. The political measures employed here do not exhaust the available pool, but they do cover a wide range of both substantive and theoretical import. A thumbnail description of these measures follows. Detailed descriptions are contained in the Appendix A.

Partisanship—Intergenerational transmission of partisanship has been a staple of scholars in the field of political socialization as well as electoral behavior and political parties. One of the indicators used here is the standard 7-point party identification measure. The second indicator, presidential vote choice, is based on the partisan direction of the vote cast in the election(s) most proximate to the survey date. For the G2-G3 analyses, we also analyze relative evaluations of Democrats vs. Republicans and of Bob Dole vs. Bill Clinton.

Civil liberties and civil rights—A hallmark of the era in which the class of 1965 came of age was an emphasis on the doctrines of civil libertarianism as stressed especially by the civil rights, free speech, and anti-war movements. Popular depictions of generation gaps evolved out of such movements. One indicator in this attitude domain concerns the respondents' attitudes toward blacks, formed from their relative rating of blacks vs. whites and their opinions on racial integration of schools. A second, two-item index assesses the individual's tolerance of non-conformity. For the G2-G3 analyses, we were also able to include evaluations of the women's movement and attitudes toward gay rights.

Other Political Issues—We also tried to capture attitudes concerning the broader spectrum of issues and groups that have been subject to political controversy over the period. This, however, was not feasible for the G1-G2 analyses, because of the limited number of issue/group attitude questions asked in the 1965 study. Still, all of our analyses employ a measure tapping opinion on school prayer and an index of the relative evaluation of big business and labor, while the G2-G3 analyses also include attitude toward abortion, evaluation of environmentalists, opinion on government job assistance, evaluation of the military, and opinion on the US's role in world affairs.

Political trust—Of all the measures employed in the project, this one has undergone the most

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[2] Panel attrition from each generation and the absence of an initial parent interview account for the difference between the 935 four-wave panel members and the 636 parent-child pairs. The retention rate from the original 1556 pairs is 41%.

[3] In assessing possible response bias we compared G2 parents whose offspring (one or more) returned a questionnaire with those whose offspring did not. In all sorts of comparisons, using socio-demographic and political variables, only one statistically significant difference emerged: mothers were more likely to have cooperating offspring than were fathers ($p<.02$).

[4] This feature raises the issue of whether the data should be weighted by number of children for analytic purposes. Because the coefficients and significance tests obtained when analyzing the weighted data are nearly identical to those based on unweighted cases we report only the unweighted results

drastic change at the aggregate level, the relatively high scores once accorded the federal government having plummeted over time. To build a political trust index we used the standard five items also found in the NES instruments.

Political engagement—Although we have extensive participation histories for each generation, no 1965 entry for G2 members exists inasmuch as they were just finishing high school at the time. Consequently, we rely on two measures that are available throughout. One is the conventional self-report of political interest—of how often the individual thinks "about what's going on in government." A second indicator consists of a knowledge index based on the number of correct answers to five factual questions.

Religious orientations—A fundamental manifestation of family-influenced socialization is that of religious identification, beliefs, and behavior (e.g., Glass, Bengston, and Dunham 1986). In order to ascertain if the processes characterizing the results in the political realm are restricted or more generalizable, we employ a two-item index of religiosity, combining frequency of church attendance and belief in the inerrancy of the Bible. While nominally tapping religiosity, these two indicators also have strong political manifestations (e.g., Leege and Kellstedt 1993, Miller and Shanks 1996, chs. 9-10).

Patterns of Parent-Child Correspondence across Time and Generations

One way to assess the staying power of parental influence consists of lagging the pair correspondence over time, using the 1965 soundings as the baseline. This procedure portrays how similar the offspring remain to their parents, as of 1965, as they traverse the life course. To accomplish this, we regressed the child's score on the ten core measures at the four points in time against the parent's score as of 1965.[5] The unstandardized regression coefficients from these analyses show how well the child's score corresponds to the parent's score; a coefficient of 0 would indicate no correspondence and a coefficient of 1 would indicate perfect correspondence. We use these coefficients to gauge similarity instead of the more customary Pearson correlation coefficients due to the wide variation in the marginal distributions that our measures undergo over the course of thirty-two years and four surveys. The regression coefficients are far less sensitive to these variations (Barton and Parsons 1977).[6] All of the measures were scaled to run from 0 to 1.

As Table 1 reveals, pair correspondence varied considerably at the beginning point in 1965. Our interest lies more in the over-time configurations, but it is worth noting that the highest concordance tends to be on objects that are more concrete, salient, long-lived, and affect laden. Accordingly, measures involving partisanship, religion, race, and knowledge lead the way. Perhaps the most inexplicable low

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[5] Specifically, we estimated a random-effects panel model, using LME in Splus, regressing the child's response on dummy variables for wave, the parent's response in 1965, and interactions between the wave variables and the parent's response. Each model allowed the child's response to be correlated across all waves and corrected for heteroskedasticity. This analysis allows us to gauge parent-child correspondence at each point in time, as indicated by the regression coefficient, while also testing for the significance of the differences in coefficients across adjacent waves. In seven out of the ten analyses, a hypothesis that correspondence diminishes linearly over time was not supported by likelihood ratio tests comparing that specification to the one we report here (exceptions are school prayer, political interest, and political knowledge).

[6] One other plausible measure of parent-child similarity is the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) (Gonzales and Griffin 2000, McGraw and Wong, 1996). Unlike the Pearson correlation (r) and the unstandardized regression coefficient (b), the ICC does not assume that the parent and child variables are linearly related. Like r but unlike b, the ICC is sensitive to changes (over time) or differences (between parents and children) in the marginals of the variables, and assumes no causal ordering between them. That said, the basic findings of this paper are confirmed when using either of these alternative measures.

relationship is that of political interest, where we might expect higher consonance on the basis of family socio-economic status alone. As we will demonstrate subsequently, certain factors do serve to heighten that relationship.

Attributes displaying more than a modicum of parent-child agreement (aside from political knowledge) in 1965 underwent a decline by 1973. Those declines accord full well with theories (Erikson 1968; Mannheim 1928) and findings (Jennings and Markus 1984; Jennings and Stoker 1999) about labileness during young adulthood. Such labileness should result in lowered parent-child agreement. Much smaller declines characterize the 1982 and 1997 figures. Even by the latter year, however, with G2 now at age 50, reasonably strong traces of parental influence remain for those measures beginning at a higher level of concordance. Nevertheless, the attrition in similarity over time rather effectively undercuts hypotheses about strong latent or delayed manifestations of parental influence. The 1965 G1-1997 G2 coefficients emphasize this point because the age of G2 in 1997 is approximately the mean age of G1 in 1965.

Lagged correspondence of the type just displayed constitutes a demanding test of the transmission model. It assumes a rather constant political environment, to say nothing of life stage permanence. Yet neither of these is constant. Both generations are living through whatever political changes are occurring in the environment and G2 in particular is experiencing dramatic life stage transitions. For this reason alone, we would expect contemporaneous assessments of correspondence to exceed those of a lagged nature, if indeed the children are carrying response predispositions "inherited" from their parents.

These expectations are only partly born out, as a comparison of Table 2 with Table 1 reveals.[7] Although contemporary correspondence in 1973 and 1982 is always stronger than lagged correspondence, these differences are insubstantial on a majority of the measures. This is particularly true of measures that involve relatively affect-free properties, such as interest or knowledge, or relatively stable attitude objects such as the political parties.

Several measures, however, do show substantially higher contemporaneous associations in 1982 (by .10 or greater): vote choice, racial attitude, opinion on school prayer, evaluation of big business vs. labor, and tolerance. For the latter three, the result is that parent-child correspondence in 1982 exceeds, by a modest margin, what was evident in 1965. Two of the measures—attitudes toward race and toward school prayer—involve contentious issues that have evoked considerable public controversy and polarization during the time span being covered. This same period brought changes in the life space of the second generation, such as the presence of school age children, that would have made the issues of school integration and school prayer more central to their lives. Similarly, one would expect contemporary correspondence to exceed lagged correspondence on vote choice, in that each campaign provides a new set of competing candidates. The comparable findings for business vs. labor also make sense given the changing political environment—with the 1982 study coinciding with the much-publicized air traffic controllers' strike—and the occupational progress of the second generation. Thus, contemporaneous exceeds lagged agreement in precisely the arenas where it should if predispositions are being passed down—in arenas marked by alterations in issue space and susceptible to alterations in life space.

Having observed the dynamics at work in the dyads composed by Generations 1 and 2, we turn next to the dynamics provided by the pairing of Generations 2 and 3. Members of G2 are now cast in

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[7] Table 2 presents results from a group mean-centered random-effects panel model, estimated using LME in Splus, in which the child's response was regressed on (a) dummy variables indicating wave of interview, (b) two parent variables: the parent's mean score across waves and the parent's deviation from that mean across waves, and (c) interactions between the wave dummies and the two parent variables (Kreft and DeLeeuw 1998, pp. 109-114). The estimated effect of the parent's mean, in each wave, is given in Table 2. Those coefficients indicate the predicted difference in the children's scores based on a unit difference in the parents' scores. The slight differences in the coefficients found in the first columns of Table 1 and 2 reflect differences in the models employed in the two sets of analyses. None of these differences are of substantive significance.

their role as socializers, rather than socializees. Because G3 ranges in age and is older on average than was G2 in 1965, the comparisons between the two sets of pairs lack exactness. To compensate for that, and to make a virtue out of variability, we distinguish two subsets of the new pairs, those including children 16-20 years of age and those 24-28. The former have a mean age of 18, which equals that for G2 in 1965, and the latter a mean age of 26, which equals G2 as of 1973. As the headings in Table 3 make clearer, this enables a comparison of the two dyads based on offspring in their late teens and in their mid-twenties.[8]

Three comparisons command attention. Consider first the pseudo-panel comparison for G2-G3 (columns 2 vs. 4). Contemporaneous correspondence tends to diminish among pairs formed from the youth in their mid-twenties compared with that found for pairs involving youth in their mid-teens, thus paralleling the general pattern in Table 2. Intriguingly, the exceptions to this pattern were also found for G1-G2: attitudes on race, school prayer, and business vs. labor. In each of these cases parent-child correspondence is at least somewhat enhanced among the older G2-G3 pairs compared with the younger G2-G3 pairs. Because the analysis holds time constant, these results support the conclusion that acquired predispositions may be activated as changes in life-stage alter issue salience.

A second comparison involves offspring in their late teens (columns 1 and 2 of Table 3). Not too surprisingly, the more recent pairs resemble the original ones in terms of what kinds of political attributes are most likely to be matched. Partisan attitudes and attitudes with a strong affective or moral component (e.g., attitudes toward blacks and toward school prayer), are most likely to be passed from parent to child, as are religious orientations. More surprisingly, correspondence in the fresh pairs essentially equals or surpasses that found in the original pairs.[9] We say surprisingly, due to the generally held notions about the declining solidity of nuclear families over the past three decades. Of special relevance to students of political partisanship are the uncannily similar coefficients for party identification and vote preference, vivid testimony to the centrality of partisanship as a socialization outcome despite contentions about the decline of parties in American politics.

The conclusion about intergenerational similarity in parent-child transmission is reinforced by a third comparison, which looks at the dyads when the offspring were in their mid-twenties (columns 3 and 4). Only one of the differences between the two sets of pairs reaches statistical significance (business vs. labor), which again belies the assumption that weakening familial ties would depress levels of parental emulation. Moreover, to the extent that differences do occur, the more recent pairs are more congruent than the older ones.

While a general pattern of similarity rather than difference characterizes the concordance pattern of transmission across generations, the few items on which differences do appear merit attention. Those differences suggest how the changing political context across generations can affect transmission levels.

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[8] To obtain the coefficients reported in Table 3, we estimated a random-effects panel model using LME in Splus. Whereas in Tables 1 and 2, the data were pooled across wave, here the data were pooled across generations. The child's response was regressed on (a) a dummy variable indicating the generational pairing (G1-G2 vs. G2-G3), (b) the parent's response, and (c) an interaction between the generational dummy and the parent's response. Each analysis corrected for heteroskedasticity across the two sets of parent-child pairs, and for correlated errors within family. Only the coefficients representing the relationship between the parent's and the child's response, in each wave, are presented.

[9] All variables are measured in identical fashion across generations except for racial attitude. The G1-G2 analysis uses an index combining (a) attitude toward school integration and (b) relative evaluation of whites vs. blacks. The G2-G3 analysis uses an index combining (a) attitude toward school integration and (c) attitude toward government assistance to blacks. Unfortunately, (b) was not asked of G3 and (c) was not asked in 1965. The reliabilities across the two scales are nearly identical, as gauged by the intercorrelation of the component variables and by a Wiley-Wiley style panel reliability analysis (see Appendixes A and B). Furthermore, no substantive conclusions are affected by this slight non-comparability between the indices. For example, the patterns Table 3 are the same as those found when using attitude toward school integration (the variable common to both indices) alone.

Consider the two political attributes having the greatest inter-generational discontinuity in transmission in Table 3: attitudes concerning race (greater for G1-G2, p=.07) and evaluation of business vs. labor (greater for G2-G3, p<.05). The diminished correspondence on attitudes concerning race for G2-G3 relative to G1-G2 makes perfect sense given the changing nature of the political environment across the period (cf. Sears and Funk 1999). Racial issues, while not absent from the 1990s political agenda, have lost the center-stage they held in the 1960s. And the higher correspondence on evaluations of business vs. labor reflects the greater significance of this dimension to politics in the 1980s and 1990s than to politics in the 1960s, as over-time analyses of data on national samples have indicated (Jennings and Stoker 1999). The political selves that parents convey to their children appear to reflect the salient political issues of the time.[10]

Data for the more recent pairs on measures not available in 1965 also bear on the replicability of family transmission patterns across the generations (Table 4). As with Table 3, pair correspondence usually declines among the older youth. Similarly, congruence is highest on measures tapping general partisan orientations, though it is also very substantial on issues with a strong moral component such as gay rights, abortion, women's rights, and environmental concerns. Indeed, the strongest relationship in either Table 3 or Table 4 occurs on the issue of abortion (.70 among the young G3-G2 pairs). Children are also quite likely to adopt the ideological identification of the parent. As expected, similarity on more abstract and less affect-laden topics tends to drop off, though it remains statistically significant in all but one case.[11]

On balance, the patterns of political reproduction do not differ appreciably across the generations. In each generation, parents were most successful in passing along their general partisan (and in G2-G3, ideological) orientations to their children. Indeed, parents were as successful in doing so as they were in transmitting their level of religiosity. They were modestly to markedly less successful on other political attributes. Still, on salient issues with a strong moral and/or affective component, such as abortion, gay rights, and equality for blacks, transmission rates were quite high, sometimes approaching or even exceeding the rates found for general partisan orientations. In terms of the political views that they acquired from their parents, then, the 1965 high school graduates do not appear as sui generis. Their own children, socialized in a strikingly different social and political era, were about as likely as they were to follow in their parents' political, and religious, footsteps.

What Increases Parent-Child Agreement?

Although transmission rates vary systematically across attitudes and across political periods, they also vary systematically across families. In this section, we evaluate two propositions about the circumstances under which transmission will be more successful. One proposition, derived from social learning theory, is that the transmission of political beliefs and attitudes from parents to children will be higher in more politicized family environments. Political engagement on the part of the parents should generate more opportunities for giving signals within the family, and hence, encourage more learning on

[10] The young G1-G2 pairs also display less consonance on religiosity than do the young G2-G3 pairs (p<.01). We suspect that this reflects an increasing polarization in the United States along the sacred/secular dimension as well as, perhaps, the increasing politicization of religiosity.

[11] Measurement unreliability will decrease the apparent level of parent-child disagreement (Dalton 1980). As such, one possible explanation for the item by item variation in parent-child correspondence is item by item variation in measurement error. In order to diminish this confound, we tried to enhance and equalize the reliability of our indicators by building multi-item indices. However, the unavailability of multiple indicators forced us to use single-item measures at various times. Nevertheless, the results of analyses that correct for measurement unreliability sustain the conclusions we draw in this section about the attributes most successfully transmitted from parent to child. See Appendix B.

the part of the child. Similarly, low levels of parent politicization should leave the child either bereft or relatively open to influence from other socializing agents, which, in turn, should discourage political consonance between parent and child. Previous work, however, indicates that these effects vary across political attitudes, ranging from decided ones in partisan-related matters (e.g. Beck and Jennings 1991) to little or none on some specific issues (e.g., Tedin 1974), thereby underscoring the virtue of our having a wide range of attitude objects, especially for the more recent set of parent-child pairs.

In contrast to most previous efforts, which used single indicators of family politicization, we assess family politicization through an index that combines two distinct components (see Appendix A). One component is a six-item index of parental political engagement that ranges from the politically industriousness to the politically inert. The second is a measure of the frequency of political discussion in the family, as reported by the child—a more direct, albeit subjective, indicator of the strength of political communication flows between parent and child. The analysis contrasts the transmission rates of parent-child pairs across levels of family politicization.

A second expectation also derives from social learning theory, informed by work in the area of belief systems. Parent-to-child transmission rates for any given political (or religious) attribute should be influenced by the clarity and the consistency of the cues that parents provide, thereby increasing perceptual accuracy, which is known to enhance transmission rates in several domains (Percheron and Jennings 1981; Tedin 1974, Westholm 1999). As public opinion research over the past thirty years has suggested, the clarity of cues will vary across individuals and across political topics. While most citizens tend to form durable views about the political parties, presidential candidates, and issues involving morality, religion, and race relations, individual differences in attitude strength and stability still persist (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Converse 1974; Converse and Markus 1979; Sears 1983; Sears and Valentino 1997). Similarly, even on issues that escape the attention and interest of most Americans, small concerned "issue publics" still exist. As Jennings and Niemi (1968) hypothesized, but did not empirically evaluate, this variation should matter to the transmission process.

> It seems unlikely that many cues would be given off over matters about which the parents were unsure or held a fluctuating opinion. Even in the event of numerous cues in unstable situations, the ambivalent or ambiguous nature of the cues would presumably yield instability in the child. In either case, the articulation between parent and child beliefs would be tempered. (Jennings and Niemi 1968, 175)

To measure consistency in cue-giving we constructed an index of the parent's response stability. For the G1-G2 analysis, parent responses from the 1965, 1973, and 1982 waves were used to build an index, for each variable, indicating response stability across the period (see Appendix A). Perfectly stable parents anchored one end of the index while parents with large fluctuations from wave to wave anchored the other. Although this measure relies on data gathered well after the child left the parent's home, we use it as an indicator of the consistency of signals while the child was being socialized. Our assumption is that the more stable the attitude from 1965-1982, the stronger the messages provided to the child in the 1950s and 1960s. We follow the same general procedure for the G2-G3 analysis, but here we gauge stability across the 1973-1982-1997 period for the G2 parents, as they aged from 25 to 50 and reared the children that make up G3.

Importantly, this measure assesses the consistency of the messages provided by parents to children even on non-attitudinal items. Stability in the parent's pattern of church attendance, for example, indicates a childhood environment building strong habits of religious involvement or non-involvement. Further, even if some of the instability observed across time is true change, as must surely be true given the long panel periods, that does not render the parental stability indicator problematic for our purposes. If the parent's political views were in flux, this should mean that more ambiguous messages were being conveyed to the child. Parent-child correspondence should still be diminished relative to the case where the parent's orientations were more durable.

The results presented in Table 5 treat the G1-G2 pairs; Table 6 provides comparable results for G2-G3 pairs; and Table 7 provides results on the additional variables available only for G2-G3. Each table contains correspondence coefficients for pairs where family politicization is either high or low (columns 1-2), and where the parent's stability on the variable in question is either high or low (columns 3-4). As with earlier tables, these coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients indicating the correspondence between the child's response in 1965 (G1-G2) or in 1997 (G2-G3) and the parent's response in that year. Asterisks indicate the results of a statistical test evaluating whether family politicization or, respectively, parent's stability, significantly enhances parent-child correspondence.[12]

Turning first to the results based on politicization, we see rather limited effects on parent-child correspondence for generations 1 and 2 (Table 5, column 1). Congruence typically increases under highly politicized environments, but only in the case of party identification, vote choice, and religiosity are these differences in the expected direction and statistically significant. Parent-child correspondence on attitudes toward race is actually diminished (though non-significant statistically) by higher family politicization. Further analysis shows that this pattern is particularly strong, and statistically significant, with respect to attitudes about school integration, which is one component of the index. Limited correspondence on this issue arises because the youth gave more support to school integration than did their parents, especially if their family life was highly politicized. We take this finding to reflect the greater sensitivity of children in more politicized homes to the powerful period forces being exerted by the contemporaneous civil rights movement.

The results for generations 2 and 3, based on a broader range of attitudinal measures, suggest a more substantial role for family politicization (Tables 6-7, columns 2-3). Again, strong effects appear for basic partisan orientations: party identification, vote choice, relative evaluations of the political parties, and feelings toward Bob Dole vs. Bill Clinton. In each of these cases, transmission rates are spectacularly higher among the most politicized pairs. Correspondence, in fact, hovers near zero for children emerging from apolitical homes, even on these basic political orientations.

At the same time, the effects of family politicization also emerge for religiosity and nine of the thirteen other political measures evaluated in Tables 6 and 7. This group of nine includes general political orientations such as political trust and political ideology, as well as specific political attitudes toward business vs. labor, gay rights, abortion, the women's movement, environmentalists, the military, and government job assistance. Overall, then, families marked by parent political engagement and frequent political interchanges are families fostering the transmission of political attitudes and identities from parent to child.

Still, in many respects the differences in levels of parental stability produce the most striking effects (Tables 5-7, last two columns). As a general rule, when the parent's attitudes are unstable, transmission is weak or nonexistent. But when they are clear and consistently cued, transmission rates are high, often dramatically so. Among pairs characterized by high levels of parental stability, correspondence levels regarding specific issues often approach the magnitude found for party identification and vote choice. Even when the differences in correspondence are not statistically significant, they typically are in the right direction and sizable in magnitude, with t-statistics approaching statistically significant levels.

Parental stability also influences correspondence in a number of cases where family politicization does not, including attitude toward race, prayer in the school, and tolerance for both sets of pairs, and views on the US role in world affairs for G2-G3. This patterning presumably reflects the importance of

[12] We estimated regression models (via OLS) that treated the child's response as dependent and included three independent variables: the parent's response, family politicization (or, in turn, the parent's stability), and the product-interaction between the two. The cell entries in Tables5-7, drawn from those analyses, are the partial slope coefficients relating the parent and child responses for those at the low and high endpoints of the politicization index (columns. 1-2) and the parental stability scales (columns 3-4). As such, each pair of coefficients provides a sense of how transmission levels vary across the full range of the moderating variables. Reported statistical significance levels refer to the test on the interaction term.

clear and consistent parental messages on political matters not ordinarily the subject of political conversation in the family. Whereas high levels of parental political engagement and family political discussion encourage parent-child consonance regarding traditional political objects such as the political parties and presidential candidates, or in attitudes on issues of heightened significance to the political controversies of the times, its effects are not always felt on more peripheral matters. In such cases, what is critical to parent-child transmission is whether the parent holds clear and consistent views.[13]

The effects of family politicization and parental stability documented in Tables 5-7 remain significant when their effects are estimated simultaneously (results not shown).[14] Family politicization and parental stability are complementary, with each elevating the likelihood that children will adopt the political orientations of the parents. Successful transmission occurs less often when the family environment is apolitical and the parents have unstable political (and religious) attributes; but similarity across generations is the norm when the home environment is politicized and when parents provide unambiguous signals about where they stand. In sum, the political texture of the family strongly conditions the reproduction of parental attributes among late adolescents.

The Long-Term Consequences of Family Transmission

In the preceding sections we have demonstrated the trail of parental influence in the customary way, as indexed by the association between parental and offspring attitudes. Now we shift the focus, somewhat, to ask how early socialization experiences affect the offspring as they wend their way through life. Are patterns of adult political development influenced by the early acquisition of parental views? If children are at least partly the product of their parents' role as political socializers, then the degree of continuity among the socializees should represent the residue of parental influence over time.

Evaluating this expectation requires distinguishing parent-child dyads by the degree to which the child begins the journey through adulthood imbued with parental political attributes. Offspring who most resemble their parents initially should, according to this argument, exhibit more over-time persistence than those less like their parents. If no differences in persistence emerge, any argument about the importance of the early political socialization within the family would be seriously undermined. Those whose derive their early political views from their parents would be indistinguishable from those whose early political views lack this parental grounding.

The design of the project makes possible such a test of parental influence. We have the initial parent-child agreement patterns as of 1965, which establish a baseline. Because of the four waves of observations on G2, we have three panel periods for purposes of calculating rates of individual-level stability. Thus, we can evaluate the continuity the youth exhibited from 1965-1973 (age 18-26), from 1973-1982 (age 26-35), and from 1982-1997 (age 35-50), comparing those who initially adopted their parent's view with those who did not. To estimate the degree of initial parent-child similarity we cross-tabulated parent and child scores on each of the individual measures to be examined and divided them according to their level of correspondence (see Appendix A for the details). To gauge over-time

[13] At the same time, parental stability appears to be inconsequential in some instances. This is especially true for political trust, in both sets of pairs. Considering the political environment in the periods under investigation, parental instability in this case most likely reflects true change rather than weak attitudes.

[14] We estimated models treating the child's responses as dependent, with five independent variables: the parent's response, family politicization, parental stability, and the interactions between the latter two variables and the parent's response. The findings confirm those presented in Tables 5-7, which contains the separately estimated effects of family politicization and parental stability.

correspondence, we calculated Pearson continuity correlations.[15]

Table 8 contains the results. Regardless of agreement level, stability tended to increase, often quite substantially, from the first panel period to the second, and then to change modestly from the second to the third. This pattern reflects the crystallization process as individuals move through young adulthood. Of more immediate relevance are the comparisons between the high and low correspondence groups. The results are a bit mixed, but two features stand out.

First, high correspondence was most consequential during the initial panel period, 1965-1973. Adolescents who were initially most like their parents were more stable during this period, though only decidedly so in 7 out of the 10 cases.[16] The significance of this pattern derives from the fact that the eight years covered by the early panel represent a time of enormous change and challenge to young adults, including new endeavors, personal relationships, residential locations, and "adult-level" contact with the political world. Those young adults entering the time frame more securely attached to the political "apron strings" of their parents were more likely to withstand the novelties they were to encounter. Those less anchored in that way proved to be far more vulnerable, and thus more apt to change.

Second, the differences between the high and low correspondence groups diminish and even sometimes reverse direction during the second and third panel periods. This development is almost completely a function of the much larger gains in stability among those starting out with lower levels of agreement with their parents. Apparently, the added years of political experience give this sub-group an additional basis for the strengthening and hardening of their political views. Of course, those in higher agreement with their parents have also accumulated more political experience, but this increment comes on top of a base already laid down by their greater consonance with their parents as well as levels of higher stability that had already been achieved between 1965 and 1973. By contrast, the gains in the low correspondence group rested but weakly on the bedrock of their parents' stances.

As a result, a different pattern of political development emerges across the groups according to the degree of initial parent/child correspondence.[17] For those who exit childhood without having embraced their parents' views, the early years of adulthood are an especially critical period of political development. As they make the transition to adulthood, they tend to significantly revise their adolescent points of view. By contrast, those who leave childhood bearing the views of their parents show much more continuity across their late-teen to early-adult years. Though still adapting and growing over this period, they more often retain the views they inherited from their parents and articulated as adolescents.[18]

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[15] Because of their ease of interpretation, we use Pearson continuity correlations to indicate over-time stability. The findings in Table 8 (and Table 9, which also presents Pearson Rs) are very similar to those found when using OLS regression coefficients to gauge continuity.

[16] To evaluate the statistical significance of the difference between the continuity correlations across the low correspondence/high correspondence groups we used the non-parametric bootstrap procedure described by Davison and Hinkley (1997, especially pp. 31-44, 204-214). We iterated the resampling procedure 10,000 times for each pair of coefficients, and drew the p-values reported in Tables 8 and 9 from bootstrap-adjusted one-sided confidence intervals. The parametric alternative, the Fisher r-to-z transformation, requires (and is sensitive to violations of) bivariate normality (Cohen and Cohen 1983). Still, the bootstrap significance levels were very similar to those we obtained using the Fisher technique.

[17] These differences between the low and high correspondence groups do not appear to be due to some other variable, like education, that also varies across the groups. This conclusion is based on the fact that (1) the correlations between the high/low correspondence variables and social traits tend to be low; and (2) the patterns evident in Table 8 emerge even when the analyses are run with controls for such variables. Furthermore, the patterns in Table 8 are even more vivid if we focus only on youth whose parents showed high levels of stability—that is, youth receiving strong parental cues.

[18] More detailed analyses reinforce the conclusion that political development over the lifespan is influenced by the early acquisition of parental political views. For example, those youth who failed to adopt their parent's party identification in 1965 express less partisan commitment in subsequent waves than do their "successfully socialized" counterparts. However, the gap between the two groups

Table 9 provides another way of looking at this long-term consequence of early socialization. Here, we examine over-time continuity in the two groups across the full 1965-1997 period. Recall that as of 1997 the "children" were now fifty years old, and some thirty-two years beyond the initial recording of parent-child similarity. To what extent does the fifty year-old adult look like the eighteen year-old adolescent? We gauge this over-time correspondence in both relative and absolute terms. Relative correspondence is indexed by a Pearson continuity correlation, calculated across the 1965-1997 period. Absolute correspondence is indexed by the percentage of those taking the same, or a very similar, position in 1965 and 1997 (see Appendix A).

The pattern of findings in Table 9 reinforces what Table 8 demonstrated. Early acquisition of parental attributes has lifelong consequences. Relative continuity, or the extent to which one's position in 1997 can be predicted by one's position in 1965 is especially enhanced for basic partisan orientations opinions toward school prayer, levels of political knowledge, and religiosity. Furthermore, on all but two items absolute continuity is significantly heightened among those who in 1965 had acquired their parents' views.[19] Illustratively, 64% of the "well-socialized" group retained their preadult party identification at age 50, compared with 55% of their "poorly socialized" counterparts. In this and most of the other cases found in Table 9, individuals bearing the trace of parental influence in 1965 showed higher levels of continuity well into middle age. This longitudinal evidence demonstrates the powerful, enduring effects of successful family transmission.

Conclusion

Transmission rates vary in fairly predictable ways across domains and across families. Significantly, and somewhat surprisingly, these conclusions stem from an analysis of one set of parent-child pairs containing a youth cohort often dubbed the Protest Generation, and a second based on the so-called Generation X. Notwithstanding the dramatic differences in family composition and life style, as well as the political environment characterizing their socialization, the reproduction of parental attributes was remarkably similar for these two sets of pairs. Adding confirmation to this conclusion are results (not shown) based on an analysis of mother-father-offspring triads formed from Generations 2 and 3. As with the triads based on Generations 1 and 2 (Jennings and Niemi 1974, ch. 6) and other triads from an earlier era (Acock and Bengston 1980), the newer triads also reveal that more influence is being exerted by mothers than by fathers, and that extra explanatory power is supplied by taking both parents (where present) into account.

By uncovering parental attributes that affect parent-child correspondence we demonstrated a fundamental, oft-neglected fact that is relevant to current public discourse concerning the political character of upcoming cohorts: parents can have an enormous degree of influence on the political learning that takes place in pre-adulthood. If parents are politically engaged and frequently discuss politics with the child, transmission rates rise substantially, particularly on topics of general political significance and salience. Thus, regular political events such as campaigns and elections provide socialization opportunities for parents (Valentino and Sears 1998), as do more episodic events. Many parents obviously opt out of these opportunities, in part due to their own low levels of politicization.

Political reproduction across the generations occurs even more frequently when parental attitudes

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diminishes over time because partisan commitment especially increases with age for those in the "unsuccessfully socialized" group. Specifically, the percentages of independents/leaners in 1973, 1982, and 1997 among the "unsuccessfully socialized" group were 59%, 55%, and 42%, respectively. Comparable percentages for the "successfully socialized" group were 36%, 37%, and 29%.

[19] The bootstrap procedure described in footnote 14 was used to calculate the statistical significance of the difference between the correlations. To test whether the differences in percentages were statistically significant, a chi-square test was used.

are reasonably consistent across time. On virtually all political (and religious) topics, transmission rates diminish when saliency and conviction are lacking—or so we conclude from the impressive findings based on parental stability. As a consequence, families will differ in what political commodities are being passed on; only if the subject matter is central to the parent will the child tend to resemble the parent. A second consequence concerns the circumstances in which parent-child political fidelity is maximized across orientations. Most children may come to resemble their parents in one or another respect. But only if parents hold stable attitudes on topics spanning the political spectrum will children reproduce their parents' political character to a much broader extent. Selective reproduction becomes, therefore, a likely outcome.

The legacy of parental influence also operates in a less obvious way. If children's political development is initiated by their parents, this should matter to how they develop subsequently. It does. Children who acquire political predispositions early in life from their parents are more stable in their early adulthood than are those who "leave home without it." Their predispositions, formed early, do persist. They carry that parental legacy forward, never fully losing the initial correspondence despite forces working to change them along the way. By contrast, those whose socialization in childhood is weak show much more instability well into their adult years. They exhibit a delayed pattern of political development, one where crystallized positions are slow to develop, one more susceptible to influences outside the childhood home.

One substantive area included in our analysis is of particular concern to students of electoral behavior and political parties. An early and abiding focus found in studies of political socialization has been that of partisan orientations, which play a central role in affecting electoral outcomes and organizing issue stances. The formation of these orientations thus assumes importance. Spanning three generations and over three decades, our results demonstrate the continuing centrality of partisanship as an outcome of familial socialization. Children adopt parental partisan orientations more so than any other political characteristics. They tend to identify with the same party, to evaluate the Republican and Democratic parties similarly, to assess the presidential candidates representing the major parties similarly, and to vote in a comparable fashion. The high levels of concordance found for partisan orientations compare favorably with those for levels of religiosity, as indexed by frequency of church attendance and beliefs about the inerrancy of the Bible. Parents are expected to exert a powerful influence on the religious practices and beliefs of their children. That they exert a similar level of influence on the child's partisan predispositions, which are presumably less central to overall character development, is both striking and significant, not least because it helps sustain a commitment to partisanship and a competitive two-party system.

Our overall results raise two particularly intriguing questions. We have mapped the lagged parent-child correspondence over time, which provides a sense of how the initial parental legacy persists. Parents, however, do not stop being parents when the child reaches age 18, and may continue to influence the child in subsequent years. And the offspring, no longer "children," may be exerting influences on the parent in turn. Though the rise over time in contemporary correspondence on certain political attitudes suggests the possibility of later-life influence, this dynamic remains to be analyzed carefully. Parents may be influencing their adult children and vice-versa. Alternatively, attributes that the two share, such as socio-economic status or partisan identification, may be shaping in parallel fashion the development of attitudes on new, or newly salient, issues. This scenario suggests a more complex model of parental influence, one wherein parents inculcate basic orientations, which then influence responses to subsequent political stimuli.

A second intriguing question involves the interaction between politicization within the family and the political climate while the child is still at home. We noted in passing that adolescents emerging from highly politicized homes in 1965 less often adopted the parental position on school integration than did adolescents from apolitical homes. This finding reflects the susceptibility of the politicized children to broader political forces at work in that they more frequently rejected the anti-integration position taken by their parents than did the other children. On the one hand, then, having a politicized family environment

typically encourages the child to learn from the parent and to adopt the parent's views. On the other hand, it also leaves the child more attuned to outside political influences. In periods of upheaval like those of the mid-1960s, or in general when the political environment contains forces antithetical to parental inclinations, this politicization may work against within-family congruence. Understanding how political engagement plays out in such cases, and tracing its implications for aggregate intergenerational change, constitutes another important challenge for future research.

Appendix A: Question Wording and Index Construction

All variables were coded to range from 0 to 1.

Party Identification. A 7-point measure, formed from the root question and follow-ups also found in the National Election Studies (NES).

Presidential Vote Choice. For 1965: vote (G1) or preference (G2) in the1964 presidential election. For 1997: an index combining vote for President in 1992 and in 1996 (with one missing value allowed). The correlation between the two components, averaged across G1 and G2, was .65.

Racial Attitude. An index averaging two component variables (with one missing data point allowed). For the G1-G2 analyses: (1) attitude toward school integration and (2) the relative evaluation of whites vs. blacks (inter-correlation, averaging across G1 and G2 in 1965, = .36). For the G2-G3 analyses: (1) attitude toward school integration and (2) attitude toward government assistance for blacks (inter-correlation, averaging across G2 and G3 in 1997, = .36). School Integration: "Some people say that the government in Washington should see to it that white and black children are allowed to go to the same schools. Others claim that this is not the government's business. Have you been concerned enough about this question to favor one side over the other? Do you think the government in Washington should see to it that white and black children go to the same schools or stay out of the area as it is none of its business?" Evaluation of Whites-Blacks: Difference between the feeling thermometer score for whites and the score for blacks. Aid to Blacks: The standard 7-point scale, with endpoints: "the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups" vs. "the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves."

Prayer in School. Based on the question: "Some people think it is all right for the public schools to start each day with a prayer. Others feel that religion does not belong in the public schools but should be taken care of by the family and the church. Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the other? Which do you think—schools should be allowed to start each day with a prayer or religion does not belong in the schools

Evaluations of (Big Business-Labor Unions), (Republicans-Democrats), (Dole-Clinton), the Women's Movement, Environmentalists, and the Military. Based on 0-100^{o} feeling thermometer ratings. For substantive and methodological reasons, difference variables were constructed when feasible. Substantively, it is the relative assessment of competing groups, like business and labor, or Republicans and Democrats that is of interest. Methodologically, difference scores enhance the reliability of the measure, while also controlling for the possibility that respondents tend to favor high or low scores on the thermometer measures.

Tolerance. An index combining responses to two agree/disagree questions (with no missing values allowed): (1) "If someone wanted to make a speech in this community against churches and religion, that person should be allowed to speak." (2) "If a Communist were legally elected to some public office around here, people should allow that person to take office." The components were correlated at r=. 20 in 1965 and at .22 in 1997 (averaging across G1 and G2 in each year).

Political Trust. An index combining the five NES items used to assess trust in the federal government (with no missing values allowed). These concern whether one can "trust the government to do what is right," whether "people running the government are dishonest," "whether the government is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves," whether "the people running the government are smart people who know what they are doing," and whether the "people in the government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes." The Cronbach's alpha was .67 in 1965 (averaging across G1 and G2) and .55 in 1997.

Interest in Politics. Based on the question: "Some people seem to think about what's going on in government most of the time whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?"

Political Knowledge. The number of correct responses to five factual questions: (1) "About how many years does a U.S. Senator serve?" (2) "Marshall Tito was a leader in what country?" (3) "Do you happen to know about how many members there are on the States Supreme Court?" (4) "During World War II, which nation had a great many concentration camps for Jews?" (5) "Do you happen to remember whether President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a Republican or a Democrat?" The Cronbach's alpha was .61 in 1965 (averaging across G1 and G2) and .61 for G2 in 1997.

Religiosity. An index averaging two component variables: frequency of church attendance and beliefs about the inerrancy of the Bible (with one missing value allowed). Church Attendance: "How often do you go to [church/synagogue]? Do you go every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?" View of Bible: Response options: (a)"The Bible is God's word and all it says is true." (b) "The Bible was written by men inspired by God it contains some human errors." (c) "The Bible is a good book because it was written by wise men, but God had nothing to do with it." (d) "The Bible was written by men who lived so long ago that it is worth very little today." The two components were correlated at .26 in 1965 (averaging across G1 and G2) and at .45 in 1997 (averaging across G2 and G3).

Political Ideology. An index averaging two component variables (with one missing value allowed): (1) self-placement on a labeled 7-point scale like that used in the NES, and (2) the difference in the feeling thermometer ratings of conservatives and liberals. The two variables were correlated at .77 in 1997.

Government Job Assistance. A 7-point scale (also carried in the NES) with labeled endpoints: "the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living" vs. "the government should let each person get ahead on his or her own."

US Role in World Affairs. A 7-point scale with labeled endpoints: "the government should pay more attention to our own needs and stop getting involved in other countries' affairs" vs. "a nation as important as ours must play a leading role in foreign affairs."

Gay Rights. An index formed by averaging three components (with one missing value allowed). (1) Agree/Disagree: "A school board should not hire a person to teach if that person is an admitted homosexual." (2) Feeling thermometer rating of "Gay men and lesbians, that is homosexuals." (3) Do you favor or oppose laws that protect homosexuals against job discrimination? Strongly or not-strongly? ?" The Cronbach's alpha was .76 in 1997 (averaging across G2 and G3.

Abortion. Based on one question with the following response options: (a) By law, abortion should never be permitted. (b) The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the woman's life is in danger. (c) The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established. (d) By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.

Family Politicization (Tables 5-7). An index formed by averaging two components (with no missing values allowed). (1) A measure of the parent's political engagement, created by summing the number of "yes" responses to six questions about political participation, including: working for a party, issue, or candidate; attempting to persuade others during election campaigns; attending meetings, rallies, or dinners; displaying campaign buttons or stickers; giving money for campaigns; and voting in the most recent presidential election. Parents were asked if they had participated in any of the non-voting activities in the past ten years (for G1) or since they were last interviewed (for G2). (2) A measure of the frequency of discussion between parent and child. The question was asked of the children in each wave (1965 and 1997), although the wording varied. In 1965 the question read: Do you talk about public affairs and politics with members of your family?" (If Yes) "How often would you say that is—several times a week, a few times a month, or once or twice a year?" In 1997 the question read: "How often do you and your parents talk about any kind of public affairs and politics, that is, anything having to do with local, state, national, or international affairs?" The response options were "very often," "pretty often," "not very often," and "never."

Parent's Stability (Tables 5-7). These variables capture the amount of change observed in the parent's

responses to a given item over time. Each variable was created in four steps. First, we computed the absolute differences of responses between adjacent waves of the survey. Second, we calculated the average of those absolute difference scores, averaging across 65-73 and 73-82 for G1, and across 73-82 and 82-97 for G2 (with no missing values allowed). Absolutely stable individuals scored 0 and scores increased with instability. Third, we recoded extremely unstable individuals (defined as having z-scores > 3.0 on the index formed from steps 1 & 2), if any, to the next lowest score found on the variable. This was done to reduce the leverage of outliers on the analysis. Finally, we scaled the variable to range from 0 (completely stable) to 1 (maximal instability observed, caveat from step 3 aside). In the analysis having to do with feelings toward Dole vs. Clinton in Table 7, parent's stability was calculated using evaluations of the presidential candidates running in 1972, 1980, and 1996: evaluations of (Nixon-McGovern) as assessed in 1973, evaluations of (Reagan-Carter) as assessed in 1982, and evaluations of (Dole-Clinton) as assessed in 1997.

Parent-Child Correspondence (Tables 8 and 9). A separate, dichotomous variable was created for each item to capture the extent of parent-child agreement in 1965. In general, the "high correspondence" group was defined as those where the parent and child had the same response on the variable in question (parent/child difference=0). However, in two cases, a more lenient classification of correspondence was used since there were so few cases of perfect agreement: attitude toward blacks, (parent/child difference of .04 or less), and business vs. labor (parent/child difference of .05 or less). In addition, for party identification the high correspondence group included those who articulated the same party preference or leaning (although the analysis makes use of the full 7-point party identification scale).

1965-1996 Absolute Continuity (Table 9). The 1965 and 1997 variables were first recoded, if necessary, to create a meaningful number of distinct categories. Then, people were categorized as stable or unstable on the basis of whether they gave the same or different responses in 1965 and 1997. The business vs. labor variable was first recoded into a 3-point scale (collapsing 0-. 44, .45-. 55, and .56-1), as was the scale tapping attitudes toward blacks and the index of religiosity. For political trust and political knowledge, the original scales were also collapsed into three point scales by combining the two low, the two middle, and the two high categories. For party identification, people were categorized as giving the same response if they expressed the same partisan preference or leaning, or lack thereof (pure independent), in 1965 and 1997. The other variables were not recoded prior to gauging over-time continuity.

Appendix B: Comment on Indicator Unreliability

Unreliability varies across indicators and, when present, will bias estimates of parent-child correspondence downward. At the same time, when viewed as a property of items and not of respondents, it should not alter conclusions about differences in parent-child correspondence across time, across generation, or across subgroups within a generation (not, that is, unless some form of complex interaction is operating). Hence, worries about measurement error are most obviously important for the conclusions drawn from Tables 3-4 about the ranking of various political (and religious) objects in terms of parent-child correspondence. We addressed this concern by evaluating the effect of measurement error in two ways.

First, we used multiple indicators in a covariance structure model to estimate the relationships between parent and child responses accounting for measurement error in the indicators, following the models laid out by Dalton (1980). This procedure requires multiple indicators of concepts in order to isolate and correct for measurement unreliability, and hence is only feasible for some of the variables we analyze in the paper. We used the following component variables to identify unique factors (1) party identification and vote, (2) evaluations of big business and labor unions, (3a) evaluations of whites, blacks, and opinion on school integration (1965, G1-G2), (3b) opinion on school integration and on government assistance to blacks (1997, G2-G3), (4) the components of the political tolerance scale, (5) the components of the political trust scale, (6) the components of the political knowledge scale, and (7) the components of the religiosity scale. Doing so resulted in stronger relationships, as expected. Correspondence on partisan orientations and religious attributes remained higher than most other political topics. Correspondence on racial attitudes, however, increased appreciably, and approached levels shown by partisan orientations and religiosity.

The second method we used to gauge the extent and consequences of measurement error requires three or more waves of panel data on each variable. The method involves two steps. First, one applies the quasi-Markov simplex model, elaborated in slightly different ways by Heise (1969) and Wiley and Wiley (1970), to estimate measurement reliabilities using the panel data (e.g., Converse and Markus 1979). Then, one uses the error variance estimate from the simplex analysis in subsequent analyses involving these variables, whether panel or not (see Green and Palmquist 1990). The virtue of this procedure for our purposes is that it is applicable for single-item indicators as well as multi-item indicators. A drawback, when working with our long-term panel data, is that the models were designed to be applied in simple test-retest (-and retest again) situations, where repeated measures of an unchanging attribute are obtained over short periods of time. They are less appropriate or inappropriate when the attribute is undergoing true change, or when the attribute is a choice over differing sets of alternatives (e.g., presidential vote choice, over time). Nevertheless, an application of this procedure to our data provides some useful information.

In Table A1, we report the results from using this method to re-estimate the relationships found in Tables 3 and 4. The analysis excludes vote choice, for which the simplex model is especially inappropriate, and other variables for which we did not have at least three waves of panel data. The reliabilities were estimated using data from 1973, 1982, and 1997 for the second generation. Although we have data for about half of the measures for four waves, the 1965-1973 period was one of enormous change for G2, making the simplex model especially inappropriate. (The 4th wave does give one leverage for estimating more complex panel models, but that was not our interest here.) Furthermore, we have data for about half of the measures from G1 for 1965, 1973, and 1982. But we chose to limit our reliability analysis to G2 in order to enhance comparability across the set. We used the Wiley-Wiley (1970) set-up rather than the Heise (1969) set-up, when identifying the simplex model. The former specifies constant error variance but allows item reliabilities to vary across waves, whereas the latter specifies constant reliability but allows the error variances to vary across waves. Results from each specification are typically very similar, but the fact that the Wiley-Wiley procedure yields one measurement error variance estimate per indicator makes it more desirable for our purposes. Finally, to gauge parent-child similarity

we estimated a regression model treating the child's response as dependent and the parent's response as independent, as we had done when producing the results found in Tables 3 and 4. This time, however, we used full-information maximum likelihood, estimating the relationship between the variables purged of measurement error (incorporating the measurement error variance component drawn from the simplex analysis).

As expected, correspondence estimates are enhanced, relative to those reported in Tables 3 and 4, and especially so for variables with low reliability (see Table A1). Still, the results are reassuring on three points. First, comparing across items, these findings reinforce the conclusions we drew from the uncorrected correspondence coefficient. Correspondence remains highest on partisan and ideological orientations along with religiosity, closely followed by (though sometimes even exceeded by) attitudes with a strong moral or affective component, and finally by beliefs of more abstract or affect-free nature. Second, the comparisons across generations (G1-G2 vs. G2-G3) also hold up. Correspondence is very similar except in certain cases, the same cases noted in Table 3 and elaborated upon in the text. Finally, we see the same cross-time pattern of results as those found in Tables 3 and 4. Correspondence tends to drop off in young adulthood, often substantially, and that is evident in the true-panel comparison (columns 1 vs. 3) as well as in the pseudo-panel comparison (columns 2 vs. 4). These last two points sustain the expectation mentioned above, that comparisons across time, across generation, and (presumably also) by subgroup would not be confounded by measurement error in the indicator used.

TABLE 1
THE PERSISTENCE OF EARLY PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCE
FIRST AND SECOND GENERATIONS

Year (Age of Child)	1965 (18)	1973 (26)	1982 (35)	1997 (50)
Party Identification	.57	.31	.33	.22
Presidential Vote Choice	.58	.35	.34	.26
Racial Attitude	.37	.17	.16	.12
Opinion on School Prayer	.34	.27	.33	.21
Evaluation of Business vs. Labor	.15	.09	.10	.11
Tolerance	.13	.12	.16	.12
Political Trust	.19	.00	-.01	.01
Interest in Politics	.11	.09	.09	.12
Political Knowledge	.46	.48	.44	.45
Religiosity	.46	.35	.39	.29

Note: Entries were obtained from random-effects panel analyses, in which the child's response was regressed on (a) dummy variables indicating wave of interview, (b) parent's response in 1965, and (c) interactions between the wave dummies and the parent's response. Only the coefficients representing the estimated effect of the parent's response on the child's response are presented. A coefficient of 1 signifies perfect parent-child agreement whereas a coefficient of 0 signifies no relationship. Each analysis was based on all pairs for whom we had (a) four waves of valid 2nd generation data and (b) three waves of valid 1st generation data on the variable in question. The Ns range from 342 to 636 depending on missing data for the variable in question. All coefficients are statistically greater than 0, at $p<.05$ or better, with the exception of those for political trust in 1973, 1982, and 1997. Wald tests for the significance of the difference between coefficients across adjacent time periods revealed (1) 1965-1973: statistically significant differences for party identification, vote choice, racial attitude, political trust, and religiosity, all at $p<.01$; (2) 1973-1982: no differences statistically significant at $p<.10$; and (3) 1982-1997: statistically significant differences for party identification and religiosity at $p<.01$. The changes in the coefficients for vote and school prayer, while sizeable, are not significant at conventional levels ($p=.15$ and $p=.10$, respectively).

TABLE 2
CONTEMPORANEOUS PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCE OVER TIME
FIRST AND SECOND GENERATIONS

Year (Average Age: Parent & Child)	1965 (46 & 18)	1973 (54 & 26)	1982 (63 & 35)
Party Identification	.62	.38	.41
Presidential Vote Choice	.65	.52	.47
Racial Attitude	.51	.37	.35
Opinion on School Prayer	.43	.46	.56
Evaluation of Business vs. Labor	.22	.21	.24
Tolerance	.18	.22	.27
Political Trust	.17	.04	.05
Interest in Politics	.15	.13	.14
Political Knowledge	.47	.52	.47
Religiosity	.51	.46	.48

Note: Entries were obtained from group mean-centered random-effects panel analyses, described in the text. Only the coefficients representing the estimated relationship between the parent's and the child's contemporaneous responses are presented. A coefficient of 1 signifies perfect parent-child agreement whereas a coefficient of 0 signifies no relationship. As with Table 1, G1-G2 pairs were analyzed if we had (a) four waves of valid 2nd generation data and (b) three waves of valid 1st generation data on the variable in question. The Ns range from 342 to 636 depending on missing data for the variable. All coefficients are statistically greater than 0, at $p<.05$ or better, with the exception of those for political trust in 1973 and 1982. Wald tests for the significance of the difference between coefficients across time periods revealed (1) 1965-1973: statistically significant differences for party identification, vote choice, racial attitude, and political trust, all at $p<.01$; (2) 1973-1982: no differences statistically significant at $p<.10$; and (3) 1965-1982: statistically significant differences for party identification, vote, and racial attitude at $p<.02$. The increase for tolerance is marginally significant, at $p=.065$.

TABLE 3
CONTEMPORANEOUS PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCE
COMPARING FIRST AND SECOND GENERATIONS WITH SECOND AND THIRD GENERATIONS

	Youth in Late Teens			Youth in Mid-20s		
	1st and 2nd Generations (1965)	2nd and 3rd Generations (1997)		1st and 2nd Generations (1973)	2nd and 3rd Generations (1997)	
Party Identification	.56	.48		.34	.38	
Presidential Vote Choice	.58	.55		.46	.34	
Racial Attitude	.40	.25	*	.24	.26	
Opinion on School Prayer	.37	.38		.29	.39	
Evaluation of Business vs. Labor	.15	.27		.17	.36	**
Tolerance	.13	.24		.17	.13	
Political Trust	.18	.10		.02	.13	
Interest in Politics	.11	.17		.10	.13	
Political Knowledge	.45	—		.41	—	
Religiosity	.46	.61	**	.39	.38	

Note: Entries were obtained from random-effects panel analyses, in which the child's response was regressed on (a) a dummy variable indicating the generational pairing (G1-G2 vs. G2-G3), (b) the parent's response, and (c) an interaction between the generational dummy and the parent's response. The analysis was carried out first for the case when the youth were in their late teens (columns 1-2) and then for the case when the youth were in their mid-20s (columns 3-4). Only the coefficients representing the estimated effect of the parent's response on the child's response (in the year named in each column) are presented. A coefficient of 1 signifies perfect agreement whereas a coefficient of 0 signifies no relationship. As with Tables 1 and 2, G1-G2 pairs were analyzed if we had (a) four waves of valid 2nd generation data and (b) three waves of valid 1st generation data on the variable in question. The Ns range from 342 to 636 depending on missing data for the variable. G2-G3 pairs were included if each member had valid data on the variable in question. The base Ns were 203 (youth aged 16-20, 2nd column) and 289 (youth aged 24-28, 4th column). Political knowledge data were not available for G3 because of the mode of data collection. All coefficients are statistically greater than 0, at $p<.05$ or better, except those for political trust in column 2 (b=.10) and column 3 (b=.02). Asterisks indicate whether the difference in the coefficients across generations is statistically significant. *$p<.10$, **$p<.05$, two-tailed.

TABLE 4
CONTEMPORANEOUS PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCE
SECOND AND THIRD GENERATIONS (1997)

	Youth Aged 16-20	Youth Aged 24-28
Evaluation of Republicans vs. Democrats	.61	.51
Evaluation of Dole vs. Clinton	.55	.51
Political Ideology	.54	.55
Opinion on Gay Rights	.53	.41
Opinion on Abortion	.70	.42
Evaluation of Women's Movement	.36	.35
Evaluation of Environmentalists	.43	.36
Evaluation of Military	.23	.22
Opinion on Government Job Assistance	.21	.16
Opinion on U.S. Role in World Affairs	.06	.09

Note: Entries are OLS coefficients obtained from regressing the child's response on the parent's response. A coefficient of 1 signifies perfect parent-child agreement whereas a coefficient of 0 signifies no relationship. The analysis was based on all available pairs where the child was aged 16-20 (base N=203) or aged 24-28 (base N=289). All coefficients except those for U.S. Role in World Affairs are statistically greater than 0, at $p<.05$ or better.

TABLE 5
EARLY PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCE
BY FAMILY POLITICIZATION AND PARENT'S STABILITY
FIRST AND SECOND GENERATIONS (1965)

	Family Politicization			Parent's Stability		
	Low	High		Low	High	
Party Identification	.39	.68	**	.37	.61	**
Presidential Vote Choice	.42	.69	**	.44	.63	**
Racial Attitude	.45	.34		.10	.55	***
Opinion on School Prayer	.35	.36		-.10	.59	***
Evaluation of Business vs. Labor	.08	.22		.03	.27	**
Tolerance	.04	.19		-.03	.21	**
Political Trust	.08	.25		.18	.21	
Interest in Politics	—	—		-.07	.19	***
Political Knowledge	.40	.41		.53	.40	
Religiosity	.30	.59	**	.24	.55	***

Note: Entries are coefficients reflecting the degree of parent/child correspondence as of 1965. A coefficient of 1 signifies perfect agreement whereas a coefficient of 0 signifies no relationship. Correspondence is reported for those taking the maximum value on the variable named in the column ("High") and for those taking the minimum value ("Low"). All coefficients are insignificantly greater than 0, at $p<.05$ or better, except those with values of .10 or less. Interest in politics was excluded from the first analysis because of its overlap with family politicization. Asterisks indicate whether family politicization—or, respectively, parent's stability—significantly enhances parent-child correspondence. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed.

TABLE 6
EARLY PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCE
BY FAMILY POLITICIZATION AND PARENT'S STABILITY
SECOND AND THIRD GENERATIONS (1997)

	Family Politicization			Parent's Stability		
	Low	High		Low	High	
Party Identification	.06	75	***	.23	.47	**
Presidential Vote Choice	.12	.74	***	.24	.49	
Racial Attitude	.20	.28		.05	.34	*
Opinion on School Prayer	.38	.57		.05	.56	***
Evaluation of Business vs. Labor	.12	.60	**	.22	.39	
Tolerance	.18	.15		-.01	.31	***
Political Trust	-.02	.28	**	.14	.09	
Interest in Politics	—	—	—	-.07	.38	***
Political Knowledge	—	—	—	—	—	—
Religiosity	.36	.68	**	.30	.57	**

Note: Entries are coefficients reflecting the degree of parent/child correspondence as of 1997, drawn from OLS regression analyses described in the text. A coefficient of 1 signifies perfect parent-child agreement whereas a coefficient of 0 signifies no relationship. Correspondence is reported for those taking the maximum value on the variable named in the column ("High") and for those taking the minimum value ("Low"). All coefficients are statistically greater than 0, at $p<.05$ or better, except those with values of .12 or less and the coefficient of .22 for Business vs. Labor in the low stability group. Interest in politics was excluded from the first analysis because of its overlap with family politicization. Political knowledge data were not available for G3. Asterisks indicate whether family politicization—or, respectively, parent's stability—significantly enhances parent-child correspondence. *$p<.10$, **$p<.05$, ***$p<.01$, one-tailed.

TABLE 7
EARLY PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCE
BY FAMILY POLITICIZATION AND PARENT'S STABILITY
SECOND AND THIRD GENERATIONS (1997)—ADDITIONAL VARIABLES

	Family Politicization			Parent's Stability		
	Low	High		Low	High	
Evaluation of Republicans vs. Democrats	.08	.83	***	.06	.82	***
Evaluation of Dole vs. Clinton	.15	.76	***	.12	.80	***
Political Ideology	.31	.73	**	.42	.59	
Opinion on Gay Rights	.26	.58	**	—	—	—
Opinion on Abortion	.26	.81	***	.36	.57	**
Evaluation of Women's Movement	.00	.71	***	.08	.50	**
Evaluation of Environmentalists	.22	.51	*	—	—	—
Evaluation of Military	.01	.47	**	.15	.28	
Opinion on Government Job Assistance	-.05	.51	**	.06	.33	
Opinion on U.S. Role in World Affairs	.10	.14		-.23	.29	***

Note: Entries are coefficients reflecting the degree of parent/child correspondence as of 1997, drawn from OLS regression analyses described in the text. A coefficient of 1 signifies perfect parent-child agreement whereas a coefficient of 0 signifies no relationship. Correspondence is reported for those taking the maximum value on the variable named in the column ("High") and for those taking the minimum value ("Low"). All coefficients are statistically greater than 0, at $p<.05$ or better, except for those with values of.15 or less and the coefficient of .28 for Evaluation of the Military in the high stability group. The parent's stability analysis could not be performed for Opinion on Gay Rights or Evaluation of Environmentalists because those variables were new to the study in 1997. Asterisks indicate whether family politicization—or, respectively, parent's stability—significantly enhances parent-child correspondence. *$p<.10$, **$p<.05$, ***$p<.01$, one-tailed.

TABLE 8
THE STABILITY OF THE CHILD'S POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS OVER TIME,
BY LEVEL OF EARLY PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCE
FIRST AND SECOND GENERATIONS

	1965-1973 Continuity			1973-1982 Continuity			1982-1997 Continuity		
	Correspondence: Low	High		Correspondence: Low	High		Correspondence: Low	High	
Party Identification	.31	.54	***	.63	.66		.57	.66	*
Vote Choice	-.05	.38	***	.51	.48		.42	.45	
Racial Attitude	.15	.25	*	.33	.29		.34	.48	**
School Prayer	.20	.39	**	.54	.55		.59	.55	
Business vs. Labor	.24	.22		.44	.47		.53	.56	
Tolerance	.31	.40	*	.53	.56		.57	.59	
Political Trust	.18	.19		.38	.33		.31	.31	
Interest in Politics	.31	.31		.39	.46		.50	.50	
Political Knowledge	.61	.79	***	.71	.84	***	.74	.80	**
Religiosity	.47	.54	*	.84	.83		.83	.86	

Note: Entries are Pearson continuity correlations, calculated across the waves named at the top of the table. They are reported for two groups—the low and high correspondence categories—distinguished on the basis of 1965 parent-child agreement levels. All correlations are significantly greater than 0, at $p<.05$ or better, except that for vote choice across1965-1973 in the low correspondence group (with an $R=-.05$). Each analysis is based on G2 respondents for whom parent data were available in 1965, and who provided valid responses across all four waves of the study. Asterisks signify whether the correlations are significantly different across the low/high correspondence group. *$p<.10$, **$p<.05$, ***$p<.01$, one-tailed.

TABLE 9
RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE CONTINUITY IN POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS FROM 1965-1997, BY LEVEL OF EARLY PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCE
FIRST AND SECOND GENERATIONS

	Relative Continuity, 1965-1997 (Pearson Rs)			Absolute Continuity, 1965-1997 (% Taking Same Stance)		
	Correspondence: Low	High		Correspondence: Low	High	
Party Identification	.18	.32	**	54.6%	64.4%	**
Vote Choice	-.04	.32	***	33.3%	54.2%	***
Racial Attitude	.15	.23		45.6%	54.0%	**
School Prayer	.04	.22	**	37.4%	68.6%	***
Business vs. Labor	.10	.20		38.0%	39.0%	
Tolerance	.26	.32		50.3%	50.6%	
Political Trust	.16	.17		16.4%	22.8%	**
Interest in Politics	.26	.33		45.0%	55.7%	***
Political Knowledge	.57	.72	***	57.3%	66.9%	**
Religiosity	.45	.53	*	50.3%	60.1%	***

Note: In the first pair of columns, entries are Pearson continuity correlations calculated across the 1965 and 1997 waves. They are reported for two groups—the low and high correspondence categories—distinguished on the basis of 1965 parent-child agreement levels. All correlations are significantly greater than 0, at $p<.05$ or better, except those for vote choice and school prayer in the low correspondence group (with Rs of -.04 and .04, respectively). In the second pair of columns, entries indicate the percent of respondents taking the same position in both 1965 and 1997, again broken down by the degree of parent-child correspondence in 1965. Each analysis is based on G2 respondents for whom parent data was available in 1965, and who provided valid responses across all four waves of the study. Asterisks signify whether the correlations (1st set) or percentages (2nd set) are significantly different across the low/high correspondence groups. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, one-tailed.

TABLE A1
PARENT/CHILD CORRESPONDENCE CORRECTED FOR MEASUREMENT ERROR

	Reliability	Youth in Late Teens G1-G2 (1965)	Youth in Late Teens G2-G3 (1997)	Youth in Mid-20s G1-G2 (1973)	Youth in Mid-20s G2-G3 (1997)
Party Identification	.88	.60	.56	.37	.43
Racial Attitude	.58/.63	.69	.40	.42	.48
School Prayer	.75	.57	.52	.46	.62
Business vs. Labor	.52	.27	.53	.35	.73
Tolerance	.59	.18	.44	.24	.35
Political Trust	.52	.25	.20	.08	.40
Interest in Politics	.55	.16	.43	.17	.27
Political Knowledge	.82	.55	—	.52	—
Religiosity	.90	.52	.74	.44	.52
Republicans-Democrats	.90	—	.67	—	.57
Political Ideology	.61	—	.90	—	.98
Women's Movement	.62	—	.62	—	.66
Military	.74	—	.36	—	.37
Government Job Assistance	.65	—	.56	—	.40

Note: With one exception, noted below, the reliability entry is drawn from a 3-wave (73-82-97) panel analysis of G2 data using the Wiley-Wiley (1970) framework. Specifically, it is the average of the three reliability coefficients generated from that analysis. The remaining entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from an analysis treating the child's response as dependent on the parent's response. These are full-information maximum likelihood estimates, corrected for measurement error by incorporating the error variance estimate from the panel analysis. The two reliability entries for Racial Attitude refer the reliability of the variable used for the G1-G2 analysis (which unlike all other reliability estimates was drawn from an analysis of the G1 data from 65-73-82) and the reliability of the variable used for the G2-G3 analysis, respectively.

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